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ABSTRACT
In this work, we propose a profile matching (or deanonymization)
attack for unstructured online social networks (OSNs) in which
similarity in graphical structure cannot be used for profile match-
ing. We consider different attributes that are publicly shared by
users. Such attributes include both obvious identifiers such as the
user name and non-obvious identifiers such as interest similarity
or sentiment variation between different posts of a user in different
platforms. We study the effect of using different combinations of
these attributes to the profile matching in order to show the privacy
threat in an extensive way. Our proposed framework mainly relies
on machine learning techniques and optimization algorithms. We
evaluate the proposed framework on two real-life datasets that are
constructed by us. Our results indicate that profiles of the users
in different OSNs can be matched with high probability by only
using publicly shared attributes and without using the underlying
graphical structure of the OSNs. We also propose possible coun-
termeasures to mitigate this threat in the expense of reduction in
the accuracy (or utility) of the attributes shared by the users. We
formulate the tradeoff between the privacy and profile utility of
the users as an optimization problem and show how slight changes
in the profiles of the users would reduce the success of the attack.
We believe that this work will be a valuable step to build a privacy-
preserving tool for users against profile matching attacks between
OSNs.
KEYWORDS
Social networks; profile matching; deanonymization; countermea-
sures
1 INTRODUCTION
An online social network (OSN) is a platform, in which, individuals
share vast amount of information about themselves such as their
social and professional life, hobbies, diseases, friends, and opinions.
Via OSNs, people also get in touch with other people that share
similar interests or that they already know in real-life [7]. With the
widespread availability of the Internet, especially via mobile devices,
OSNs have been a part of our lives more than ever. Most individuals
have multiple OSN profiles for different purposes. Furthermore,
each OSN offers different services via different frameworks, leading
individuals share different types of information [8].
The most common (and basic) types of information that is shared
by the individuals in OSNs include screen name, age, gender, loca-
tion, date of birth, profile photo, and e-mail address [7]. However,
such information is usually incomplete and inconsistent across
different OSNs. Also, in some OSNs (e.g., Facebook), users mostly
∗Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval has been obtained to conduct this work.
reveal their real identities (e.g., to find old friends), while in some
OSNs users mainly prefer to remain anonymous (especially in OSNs
in which users share sensitive information about themselves, such
as health status).
It is trivial to link profiles of individuals across different OSNs in
which they share their real identities. However, such profile match-
ing is both nontrivial and sometimes undesired if individuals do not
reveal their real identities in some OSNs. While profile matching
is useful for online service providers to build complete profiles of
individuals (e.g., to provide better personalized advertisement), it
also has serious privacy concerns. If an attacker can link anony-
mous profiles of individuals to their real identities (via their other
OSN accounts in which they share their real identity), he can obtain
privacy-sensitive information about individuals that is not intended
to be linked to their real identities. Such sensitive information can
then be used against the individuals for discrimination or black-
mailing. Thus, it is very important to quantify and show the risk of
such profile matching attacks and provide countermeasures against
them.
An OSN can be characterized by (i) its graphical structure (i.e.,
connections between its users) and (ii) the attributes of its users
(i.e., types of information that is shared by its users). The graphical
structures of most popular OSNs show strong resemblance to social
connections of individuals in real-life (e.g., Facebook). Therefore,
it is natural to expect that the graphical structures of such OSNs
will be similar to each other as well. Existing work shows that
this similarity in graphical structure (along with some background
information) can be utilized to link accounts of individuals from
different OSNs [23]. However, without sufficient background infor-
mation, just using graphical structure for profile matching becomes
computationally infeasible.
Furthermore, some OSNs or online platforms either do not have
a graphical structure at all (e.g., forums) or their graphical structure
does not resemble the real-life connections of the individuals. A
good example for the latter is health-related OSNs such as patients-
likeme.com. In this OSN, people share sensitive information about
themselves such as their health conditions, diseases, diagnosis, and
the drugs they use, and hence most users do not share their real
identity. Users also follow each other, especially if they have sim-
ilar diseases (e.g., to get more information about the alternative
treatments of the disease). Thus, the OSN has a graphical structure,
but this structure has no similarity to the real-life connections of
the users, and hence an attacker cannot use the graphical structure
to link the accounts of patientslikeme users to their accounts in
other OSNs (in which they share their identifiers). However, this
does not mean that users of such OSNs are protected against profile
matching (or deanonymization) attacks. In this type of OSNs, an
attacker can utilize the attributes of the users across different OSNs
for deanonymization.
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In this work, we propose a profilematching (or deanonymization)
scheme that quantifies and shows the risk of the profile matching at-
tack in unstructuredOSNs.We show the threat between an auxiliary
OSN (in which users share their real identities) and an anonymous
OSN (in which users prefer to make anonymous sharings). The pro-
posed scheme matches user profiles across multiple OSNs by using
machine learning and optimization techniques. We mainly focus on
two types of attacks (i) targeted attack, in which the attacker selects
a set of victims from the auxiliary OSN and wants to determine the
profiles of the victims in the anonymous OSN, and (ii) global attack,
in which the attacker wants to deanonymize the profiles of all the
users that are in the anonymous OSN (assuming they have accounts
in the auxiliary OSN). Our results show that by using different ma-
chine learning (linear regression and support vector machine) and
optimization techniques, individuals’ profiles can be matched with
up to 70% success (depending on the set of attributes used for the
attack). We also study the effect different types of attributes (i.e.,
obvious identifiers and non-obvious identifiers) to the proposed
attack. Furthermore, we propose possible countermeasures against
the proposed attack. That is, we show how slight changes in users’
attributes (e.g., change in the time of some posts) would reduce the
success of the proposed attack, and hence prevent profile matching.
Note that the proposed framework can also be used in structured
OSNs (along with the structural information).
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as fol-
lows:
• We develop a profile matching attack across unstructured
OSNs by using various publicly shared attributes of the
users and show how the privacy risk can be quantified.
• We study the effect of different sets of publicly shared
attributes to the proposed attack. In particular, we show
how obvious identifiers (such as the user name and loca-
tion) and non-obvious identifiers (such as activity patterns
across OSNs, interests, or sentiment) of the users help the
attacker.
• We propose potential countermeasures against the pro-
posed attack. By formulating the proposed countermea-
sures as an optimization problem, we show how the users
canminimize the profile matching threat while maximizing
the utility they get from the OSNs.
• We evaluate the proposed attack and the countermeasures
on two different real-life datasets that are constructed by
us.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we discuss the threat model. In Section 3, we detail the proposed
framework for profile matching in unstructured OSNs. In Section 4,
we show the results of the proposed attack by using real data. In
Section 5, we propose possible countermeasures against the pro-
posed attack in the expense of reduction in the utility. In Section 6,
we summarize the related work and the main differences of this
work from the existing work in the area. Finally, in Section 7, we
discuss the future work and conclude the paper.
2 THREAT MODEL
For simplicity, we consider two OSNs to describe the threat: (i) A,
the auxiliary OSN that includes the profiles of individuals with
their identifiers, and (ii)T , the target OSN that includes anonymous
profiles of individuals. In general, the attacker knows the identity of
the individuals from OSNA and depending on the type of the attack,
he wants to determine the real identities of the user(s) in OSNT by
only using the public attributes of the users (i.e., information that
is publicly shared by the users). The attacker can be a part (user)
of both OSNs and it can collect publicly available data from both
OSNs (e.g., via crawling). We assume that the attacker is not an
insider in T . That is, the attacker cannot use the IP address, access
patterns, or sign up information of the victim for profile matching
(or deanonymization).
We consider two different attacks (i) targeted attack, and (ii)
global attack. In the targeted attack, the attackerwants to deanonymize
the anonymous profile of a victim (or a set of victims) in OSN T ,
using the unanonymized profile of the same victim in OSNA. In the
global attack, the attacker’s goal is to deanonymize the anonymous
profiles of all individuals in T by using the information in A.
3 PROPOSED MODEL
LetA andT represent the auxiliary and the target OSN, respectively,
in which people publicly share attributes such as date of birth, gen-
der, and location. Profile of a user i in eitherA orT is represented as
U ki , where k ∈ {A,T }. In this work, we focus on the most common
attributes that are shared in many OSNs. Thus, we consider the
profile of a user i as U ki = {nki , ℓki ,дki ,pki , f ki ,aki , tki , ski }, where n
denotes the user name, ℓ denotes the location, д denotes the gender,
p denotes the profile photo, f denotes the freetext provided by the
user in the profile description, a denotes the activity patterns of
the user in a given OSN (i.e., time instances at which he is active),
t denotes the interests of the user (on that particular OSN), and s
denotes the sentiment profile of the user. As discussed, the main
goal of the attacker is to link the profiles between two OSNs. Gen-
eral notations that are used in the proposed model are presented in
Table 1. Furthermore, the overview of the proposed framework is
shown in Figure 1.
A
Auxiliary OSN, in which profiles of individuals
include their real identifiers
T
Target OSN, in which profiles of individuals
do not include their real identifiers
UAi Profile of user i in OSN A
UTj Profile of user j in OSN T
G Set of coupled profiles from A and Tbelonging to the same individual
I Set of uncoupled profiles from A and Tbelonging to different individuals
S(UAi ,UTj ) General similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(nAi ,nTj ) Username similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(ℓAi , ℓTj ) Location similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(дAi ,дTj ) Gender similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(pAi ,pTj ) Photo similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(f Ai , f Tj ) Freetext similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(aAi ,aTj ) Activity pattern similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(tAi , tTj ) Interest similarity ofUAi andUTj
S(sAi , sTj ) Sentiment similarity ofUAi andUTj
Table 1: Symbols and notations used in this work.
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed profile matching framework.
In general, the proposed scheme is composed of two main parts:
(i) Steps 1-4 (in Figure 1) constitute the training part and they are
the offline steps of the algorithm, and (ii) Steps 5-7 are the attack
part. In Step 1, profiles and attributes of a set of users are obtained
from both OSNs to construct the training dataset. We denote the set
of profiles that are extracted for this purpose from OSNsA andT as
At and Tt, respectively. We assume that profiles are selected such
that some profiles in At and Tt belong to the same individuals and
some do not (more details on collecting such profiles can be found
in Section 4.1).1 We let set G include pairs of profiles (UAi ,UTj ) from
At and Tt that belong to the same individual (i.e., coupled profiles).
Similarly, we let set I include pairs of profiles (UAi ,UTj ) from At
and Tt that belong to different individuals (i.e., uncoupled profiles).
In Step 2, for each pair of users in sets G and I, we compute
the attribute similarity by using the metrics that are discussed in
Section 3.1. In Step 3, we label the pairs in sets G and I and add them
to the training dataset. If the pair is in set G, we label the pair as
“1”, otherwise we label it as “0”. In Step 4, we train our model using
different machine learning techniques such as linear regression and
support vector machine to learn the contribution of each attribute
to the profile matching attack (details of this step are discussed in
Section 3.2). In Step 5, the attack type is determined and profiles to
be matched are selected, and hence sets Ae and Te are constructed.
For simplicity, we assume setAe includes N users fromA and set Te
includes N users fromT .2 In Step 6, every profile in set Ae is paired
1Such profiles are required to construct the ground-truth for training.
2Sets Ae and Te do not include any users from sets At and Tt .
with every profile in set Te and the similarity between each pair
is computed by using the trained model. At the last step (Step 7),
profiles in sets Ae and Te are paired by maximizing similarities
using an optimization algorithm as discussed in Section 3.3.
3.1 Similarity Metrics
To create the model, it is required to define similarity metrics for
the attributes inU ki . In this section, we provide the details of the
similarity metrics we propose for each attribute.
3.1.1 User name similarity - S(nAi ,nTj ). We use Levenshtein dis-
tance [17] to calculate the similarity between user names of profiles.
Given the user names nAi and n
T
j of two individuals i and j with
profiles UAi , and U
T
j , and assuming |nAi | and |nTj | represent the
lengths of these user names, Levenshtein distance between the user
names can be computed as below.
lev(nAi ,nTj )(|n
A
i |, |nTj |) =
max(|nAi |, |nTj |), if min(|nAi |, |nTj |) = 0
min

levnAi ,n
T
j
(|nAi | − 1, |nTj |) + 1
levnAi ,n
T
j
(|nAi |, |nTj | − 1) + 1
levnAi ,n
T
j
(|nAi | − 1, |nTj | − 1) + 1nAi,nT j , o/w
(1)
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Thus,
S(nAi ,nTj ) = 1 −
lev(nAi ,nTj )(|n
A
i |, |nTj |)
max(|nAi |, |nTj |)
. (2)
3.1.2 Location similarity - S(ℓAi , ℓTj ). Almost all OSNs have lo-
cation or hometown information available in user profiles. Even if
such location information is not directly available, other types of
information can be used to predict location of a profile. For instance,
location of a post or location-related information in the freetext
can be used to predict of the location (or hometown) of a profile.
Location information collected from the users’ profiles is usually
text-based. If the textual values of location attributes belonging
to two different profiles are exactly the same, we set the location
similarity of these two profiles as “1”. Otherwise, we convert the
textual information into coordinates and calculate geographic dis-
tance. We do this conversion via GoogleMaps API [4]. Let ℓAi and
ℓTj represent the location attributes of users i and j, respectively.
We compute the location similarity between two user profiles as
below.
Lat(ℓAi ),Lon(ℓAi ) = GetCoordinate(ℓAi )
Lat(ℓTj ),Lon(ℓTj ) = GetCoordinate(ℓTj )
GD = GeoDistance(Lat(ℓAi ),Lon(ℓAi ),Lat(ℓTj ),Lon(ℓTj ))
S(ℓAi , ℓTj ) = 1 − Norm(GD).
Here, Norm is a normalization function based on all computed
values in the dataset. To calculate the geographic distance (GD) we
use haversine formula which can be computed as follows:
α =sin2(Lat(ℓAi ) − Lat(ℓTj )) + cos(Lat(ℓAi )) · cos(Lat(ℓTj ))
· sin2(Lon(ℓAi ) − Lon(ℓTj ))
β =2 · atan2(
√
(α),
√
(1 − α))
GD = R · β ,
(3)
where R is earth’s radius (mean radius = 6371 km).
3.1.3 Gender similarity - S(дAi ,дTj ). Availability of gender infor-
mation is mostly problematic in OSNs. Some OSNs do not publicly
share the gender information of their users. Furthermore, some
OSNs do not even collect this information. In such cases, a profile’s
gender can be predicted from other information. In our model, if
an OSN does not provide the gender information publicly (or does
not have such information), we probabilistically infer the gender
information by using a public name database. That is, we use the US
social security name database3 and look for a profile’s name (or user
name) to probabilistically infer the possible gender of the profile
from the distribution of the corresponding name (among males and
females) in the name database. We then use this probability as the
S(дAi ,дTj ) value between two profiles.
3.1.4 Profile photo similarity - S(pAi ,pTj ). Profile photo similar-
ity is calculated through a framework named OpenFace [1]. Open-
Face is an open source tool performing face recognition. OpenFace
first detects the face (in the photo), and then preprocesses it to
3US social security name database includes year of birth, gender, and the corresponding
name for babies born in the United States.
create a normalized and fixed-size input for the neural network.
The features that characterize a person’s face are extracted by the
neural network and then used in classifiers or clustering techniques.
OpenFace notably offers higher accuracy than previous open source
frameworks. Given two profile photos pAi and p
T
j , OpenFace returns
the photo similarity, S(pAi ,pTj ), as a real value between 0 (meaning
exactly the same photo) and 4.
3.1.5 Freetext similarity - S(f Ai , f Tj ). Freetext data in an OSN
profile could be a short biographical text or an “about me” page. In
the proposed model, NER (named-entity recognition) [9] is used
to extract features from the freetext information. The extracted
features are location, person, organization, money, percent, date,
and time. To calculate the freetext similarity between the profiles
of two users, we use the cosine similarity between the extracted
features from each user. Let f Ai and f
T
j be two vectors composed
of the extracted words by the NER in the freetext provided by users
i and j in OSNs A and T , respectively. FA,Ti, j is the set of unique
words in f Ai and f
T
j . Let also f req
A
i and f req
T
j be two vectors
of size |FA,Ti, j | representing the frequency of each word in FA,Ti, j in
vectors f Ai and f
T
j , respectively. Then, cosine similarity between
the freetexts of two user profiles can be computed as below.
S(f Ai , f Tj ) =
f reqAi · f reqTj
| f reqAi | | f reqTj |
=
∑ |FA,Ti, j |
i=1 f req
A
i f req
T
j√∑ |FA,Ti, j |
i=1 (f reqAi )
2∑ |FA,Ti, j |
j=1 (f reqTj )
2
.
(4)
3.1.6 Activity pattern similarity - S(aAi ,aTj ). Activity pattern
similarity is defined as the similarity between observed activity
patterns of two profiles (e.g., login or post). Let aAi represent a
vector including the times of last |aAi | activities of user i in OSN A.
Similarly, aTj is a vector including the times of last |aTj | activities of
user j in OSNT . First, we compute the time difference between every
entry in aAi and a
T
j and we determine min(|aAi |, |aTj |) pairs whose
time difference is the smallest. Then, we compute the normalized
distance between thesemin(|aAi |, |aTj |) pairs to compute the activity
pattern similarity between two profiles.
3.1.7 Interest similarity - S(tAi , tTj ). OSNs provide a platform
in which users share their opinions via posts (e.g., tweets or tips),
and this shared content is composed of different topics. In our
framework, we use the topic similarity of shared content (posts)
in profiles to calculate the interest similarity between the users. In
highlevel, first, we create a topic model using the posts of randomly
selected users from both the auxiliary and the target OSNs. Then,
by using the created model, we compute the topic distribution of
each post generated by the users of the auxiliary and the target
OSNs. Finally, we compute the interest similarity from the distance
of the computed topic distributions.
To create a topicmodel we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [6].
LDA is a generative probabilistic and graphical model. In LDA it
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is assumed that each word is drawn from one of the hidden topics
and each document (shared content) is a mixture of multiple top-
ics where the topics are modeled as probability distributions over
a fixed vocabulary. Thus, LDA aims to infer the document-topic,
topic-word distributions and topic assignments to words.
Let tAi and t
T
j represent the set of posts generated in two profiles
UAi and U
T
j . Assume a topic model consisting θ topics (LDA) is
created. Then, we first find the normalized topic distribution of
each profile as follows:
dtAi
=
1
|tAi |
|tAi |∑
m=1
LDA(tAi (m))
dtTi
=
1
|tTi |
|tTi |∑
m=1
LDA(tTi (m)),
where both dtAi and dtTj are vectors of size θ representing the
distributions of the topics the users posted about. Then, we find
the interest similarity between users i and j as follows:
S(tAi , tTj ) = 1 −
1
θ
θ∑
m=1
|dtAi (m) − dtTj (m)|. (5)
3.1.8 Sentiment similarity - S(sAi , sTj ). Users typically express
their emotions when sharing their opinions about certain issues
on OSNs. To determine whether the shared text (e.g., post, tip, or
tweet) expresses positive or negative sentiment we use sentiment
analysis through Python NLTK (natural language toolkit) Text
Classification [30]. Given the text to analyze, the sentiment analysis
tool returns the probability for positive and negative sentiment in
the text. Since users’ mood is affected from different factors, it is
realistic to assume that it might change by time (e.g., daily). Thus,
we compute the daily sentiment profile of each user, and daily
sentiment similarity between the users. For this, first, we compute
the normalized distribution of the positive and negative sentiments
per day for each user, and then we find the normalized distance
between these distributions for each user pair.
3.2 Training the Model
As discussed, we first construct sets At and Tt for training. Also,
set G includes pairs of profiles (UAi ,UTj ) that belong to the same
individual and set I includes pairs of profiles (UAi ,UTj ) from At and
Tt that belong to different individuals. We refer to the pairs in G
as “coupled profiles” and the ones in I as “uncoupled profiles”. We
first compute the individual attribute similarities between each pair
of coupled and uncoupled profiles in G and I using the similarity
metrics described in Section 3.1. Then, to train our model, we use
two different machine learning techniques: (i) linear regression and
(ii) support vector machine (SVM).
3.2.1 Linear Regression. Prior work shows that linear regres-
sion is an efficient way to learn attribute weights for social network
related data [8]. Therefore, we apply linear regression to our train-
ing dataset in order to learn the contribution (or weight) of each
attribute for the profile matching attack. Notations we use for this
part are listed in Table 2.
wn Weight of user name
wℓ Weight of location
wд Weight of gender
wp Weight of profile photo
wf Weight of freetext
wa Weight of activity pattern
wt Weight of interest
ws Weight of sentiment
Table 2: Notations used in the linear regression.
We learn the contribution (or weight) of each attribute for the
profile matching attack via linear regression as follows:
S(UAi ,UTj ) =
{
1 = y, if (UAi ,UTj ) ∈ G
0 = y, if (UAi ,UTj ) ∈ I
(6)
where,
y =w0 +wn × S(nAi ,nTj ) +wℓ × S(ℓAi , ℓAj )
+wд × S(дAi ,дTj ) +wp × S(pAi ,pTj )
+wf × S(f Ai , f Tj ) +wa × S(aAi ,aTj ) +wt × S(tAi , tTj )
(7)
3.2.2 Support Vector Machine. One of the recent works [19, 20]
presents a profile matching framework that relies on support vector
machine(SVM). Thus, to observe the effect of different machine
learning techniques to the success of the attack, we also applied
SVM for training part of proposed attack. SVMs use decision planes
and they are mainly used for classification tasks. However, they
can be also used for regression tasks (as in our work). In SVM
regression, the input is mapped onto an m-dimensional feature
space (m is the number of attributes in our case), and then a linear
model is constructed as follows:
S(UAi ,UTj ) = f (x ,w) =
m∑
j=1
w jдj (x) + b, (8)
where x is anm-sized vector that is composed individual attribute
similarities for each profile pair, дj (x) (j = 1, . . . ,m) is a set of
nonlinear transformations, and b is the bias term. Thus, to learn the
weights (w) and the bias parameter (b) we minimize the following:
1
2 ∥w ∥
2 +C
n∑
i=1
ξii ‘
s .t .

yi − f (xi ,w) ≤ ε + ξ ∗i
f (xi ,w) − yi ≤ ε + ξi
ξiξ
∗
i ≥ 0,
(9)
where yi equals to 1 if the pair is coupled, otherwise 0. ε is the
empirical risk of regression, ξ is slack variable, and n is the number
of slack variables.
3.3 Matching Profiles
As discussed, for profile matching attack, we consider the users in
setsAe andTe from the auxiliary and the target OSNs. For simplicity,
we also assume that both sets include N users.4 Before the actual
profile matching, individual attribute similarities between every
profile in Ae and in Te are computed using the similarity metrics
4The case when the sizes of the OSNs are different can be also handled similarly (by
padding one OSN with dummy users to equalize the sizes).
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described in Section 3.1. Then, the general similarity S(UAi ,UTj )
is computed between every user in Ae and Te using the weights
determined in Section 3.2. Let Z be a N × N similarity matrix that
is constructed from the pairwise similarities between the users in
Ae and Te as below:
Z =

S(UA0 ,UT0 ) . . . S(UA0 ,UTN )
...
. . .
...
S(UAN ,UT0 ) . . . S(UAN ,UTN )

Our goal is to obtain a one-to-one matching between the users
in Ae and Te that would also maximize the total similarity. To
achieve this matching, we use the Hungarian algorithm, a combina-
torial optimization algorithm that solves the assignment problem
in polynomial time [15]. The objective function of the Hungarian
algorithm can be expressed as below.
max
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
−Z i jxi j ,
where, −Zi j represents the similarity between UAi and UTj (i.e.,
S(UAi ,UTj )). Also, xi j is a binary value, that is, xi j = 1 if profiles
UAi and U
T
j are matched as a result of the algorithm, and xi j = 0
otherwise. After performing the Hungarian algorithm to the Z
matrix, we obtain a matching between the users in Ae and Te that
maximizes the total similarity. Note that we multiply Zi j values
with -1, in order to obtain the maximum similarity (profit).
4 EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the proposed framework by using real
data from three OSNs. We also study the impact of various sets of
attributes to the profile matching.
4.1 Data Collection
In the literature there are limited datasets that can be used for
profile matching between unstructured OSNs. Thus, to evaluate
our proposed framework, we created two dataset that consist of
users from three OSNs (Twitter, Foursquare, and Google+) with
several attributes. The most challenging part of data collection was
to obtain the “coupled” profiles between OSNs that belongs to same
person in real-life. In the following, we discuss our data collection
methodology.
4.1.1 Dataset 1: Twitter - Foursquare. We utilized Twitter API
(through twitter4j Java library [31]), and Foursquare API [2] for
the data collection (i.e., collection of the attributes for the coupled
and uncoupled profiles). To automate the coupled profile collection
process, we used Twitter Streaming API [5]. When an individual
generates a check-in in the Swarm app5 [29], and publishes it via
Twitter with a tweet, we catch the corresponding tweet, parse
Twitter and Foursquare attributes, and connect the corresponding
Twitter and Foursquare accounts to each other (as coupled profiles).
We used Foursquare as our auxiliary OSN (A) and Twitter as our
target OSN (T ).
5Swarm is a companion app to Foursquare. It allows users to share their locations
within their social network.
Furthermore, we also randomly paired uncoupled profiles which
are used for training and testing the proposed algorithm. From each
coupled or uncoupled profile, we extracted the following informa-
tion: (i) from Foursquare; firstname/lastname, last 20 tips of the
user (freetext comments about the locations), times of last 20 tips,
freetext about the user, gender, location, and profile photo, and (ii)
from Twitter; name/screenname, last 20 tweets of the user and their
times, freetext about the user, location, profile photo, and timezone.
Due to the special characteristics of Twitter and Foursquare, we
slightly changed some of our similarity calculations as follows. On
Twitter, users can declare a “screen name” and “name” separately.
We observed that some users declare their real first names or last
names in either of these fields. On the other hand, on Foursquare,
users fill the “firstname” and “lastname” fields. As a result, we cre-
ated 4 types of name similarity metrics by using combination of
names: (i) Twitter screen name and Foursquare firstname, (ii) Twit-
ter screen name and Foursquare lastname, (iii) Twitter name and
Foursquare firstname, (iv) Twitter name and Foursquare lastname.
4.1.2 Dataset 2: Google+ - Twitter Dataset. In this dataset, we
used Twitter as our auxiliary OSN (A) and Google+ as our tar-
get OSN (T ). To create this dataset, we used Google+ and Twitter
APIs [3, 31]. To collect the coupled profiles between Google+ and
Twitter, we first visited random Google+ profiles and parsed the
“social links data” (that includes the URLs to the other OSN accounts
of the users) of each visited profile. If a social link data contains
a valid Twitter profile, we then visited the corresponding Twitter
profile and extracted the same attributes as in Database 1 from the
Twitter profile. Also, we extracted the following information from
the Google+ profiles of the users: given name, last name, username,
location, profile photo, gender, skills, tagline, about me, the last 20
activities of the user, and the times of the last 20 activities.
Similar to Database 1, due to special characteristics of Google+
and Twitter, we created 6 types of name similarity metrics. As
mentioned, in Twitter users can share their “screen name” and
“name”. On the other hand, in Google+, users may share their “given
name”, “last name”, and “username”. Thus, we obtained 6 different
combinations for the user name attribute: (i) Twitter screen name
and Google+ given name, (ii) Twitter screen name and Google+ last
name, (iii) Twitter screen name and Google+ username, (iv) Twitter
name and Google+ given name, (v) Twitter name and Google+ last
name, and (vi) Twitter name and Google+ username.
As a result, both Dataset 1 and Dataset 2 consists of 4000 profile
pairs each, of which 2000 are coupled and 2000 are uncoupled
profiles. To create the LDA model, we randomly sampled a total
of 15000 tweets (from Twitter), tips (from Foursquare), and posts
(from Google+) and generated the model by using this data. Then,
we applied the model to the posts of the users to find the interest
similarity as discussed in Section 3.1. Note that theremay bemissing
attributes (that are not published by the users) in the database.
Due to such missing attributes, it is not possible to compute the
similarity values for some attributes between some users. In such
cases, based on the distributions of the similarity values of each
attribute between the coupled and uncoupled pairs (as also shown in
Figures 2 and 3), we assign a value for the similarity that minimizes
both the false positive and false negative probabilities.
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Figure 2: Probability distributions of attribute similarities among the pairs used for the training in the Twitter - Foursquare
dataset (D1).
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Figure 3: Probability distributions of attribute similarities among the pairs used for the training in the Google+ - Twitter
dataset (D2).
4.2 Training
In the rest of the paper, we will hold the discussion over a target
and auxiliary network as the training process is the same for both
datasets. As mentioned, in our first dataset, Twitter is the auxiliary
network and Foursquare is the target network. In the second dataset,
Google+ is the target network and Twitter is the auxiliary network.
From each dataset, we selected 3000 profile pairs for training. These
pairs consists of 1500 coupled and 1500 uncoupled profile pairs.
Probability distributions of the attribute similarities for the training
instances in both datasets are shown in Figures 2 and 3.
To train the model, we used two different machine learning
techniques: (i) linear regression and (ii) support vector machine.
Overall, we conducted four experiments by using different sets of
attributes we considered. For each experiment, we also present
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the weights obtained as a result of the linear regression model in
Table 3 as those provide a good representation for the importance
of the attributes for the profile matching attack. As discussed in
Section 4.1, we considered multiple user name similarity metrics for
both datasets. In Table 3, we only report the user name similarity
for the metric with the highest weight (for the linear regression
model) for each dataset.
In our first experiment (Experiment 1), we used all the attributes
(including all user name similarity metrics) we extracted from both
OSNs for the training. We observe that location, user name (in
particular Foursquare firstname - Twitter screen name in Dataset 1
and Twitter name - Google+ username in Dataset 2), and profile
photo attributes are the most identifying attributes to determine
whether two profiles belong to same individual or not. In the second
experiment (Experiment 2), we only used the four most identify-
ing attributes based on the weights in Table 3 for Experiment 1.
Thus, we only used the attributes related to the user name (i.e.,
the user name similarity for the metric with the highest weight),
location, profile photo, gender (for Dataset 2), and activity pattern
(for Dataset 1).
We observed that the most identifying attribute for the profile
matching attack is the user name. Since it is trivial for the users to
obtain a different user name for their accounts in different OSNs, for
the remaining experiments, we did not use the user name attribute
and we evaluated the success of other (less identifying) attributes
for the attack. Thus, in the third experiment (Experiment 3), we
used all the attributes but the user name. In the fourth and the
last experiment (Experiment 4), we only considered the activity
patterns, freetext, interests (that is extracted from users’ posts), and
sentiment. Note that this last scenario can be also used to quantify
the risk of profile matching between an OSN and a profile in a
forum (in which users typically remain anonymous, and activity
patterns, freetext, interests, and sentiment are the only attributes
that can be learnt about the users). Following our training model,
we compute the general similarity between profilesUAi andU
T
j for
both machine learning techniques.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4
Attribute W(D1) W(D2) W(D1) W(D2) W(D1) W(D2) W(D1) W(D2)
user name (wn ) 0.65 0.56 0.93 0.75 N/A N/A N/A N/A
location (wℓ ) 0.35 0.13 0.45 0.17 0.56 0.55 N/A N/A
gender (wд ) 0.21 0.09 N/A 0.10 0.34 0.30 N/A N/A
profile photo (wp ) 0.35 0.26 0.51 0.28 0.83 1.06 N/A N/A
freetext (wf ) 0.06 0.06 N/A N/A 0.14 0.24 0.22 0.45
activity pattern (wa ) 0.63 ∼ 0 0.88 N/A 1.10 0.22 1.3 0.26
interest (wt ) ∼ 0 0.06 N/A N/A ∼ 0 0.24 ∼ 0 0.45
sentiment (ws ) ∼ 0 ∼ 0 N/A N/A ∼ 0 0.15 ∼ 0 ∼ 0
Table 3: Weights of attributes computed as a result of linear
regressionmodel for Experiment 1 (in whichwe use all the at-
tributes), Experiment 2 (in which we only use the four most
identifying attributes), Experiment 3 (in which we use all the
attributes except for the user name), and Experiment 4 (in
which we use the weakest identifiers) for both Dataset 1 (D1)
and Dataset 2 (D2). N/A means the corresponding attribute
is not used in the corresponding experiment.
4.3 Profile Matching and Evaluation Metrics
After training the model for all the experiments, we selected 1000
users from the auxiliary OSN and 1000 users from the target OSN to
construct sets Ae and Te, respectively (for both datasets). Note that
none of these users were involved in the training set. Among these
profiles we had 500 coupled pairs. Thus, we evaluated the success
of our proposed framework based on the matching between these
coupled profiles.
To evaluate our model, we consider two types of profile matching
attacks: (i) targeted attack, and (ii) global attack. In targeted attack,
the goal of the attacker is to match the anonymous profiles of one or
more target individuals from T to their corresponding profiles in A.
In the global attack, the goal of the attacker is to match all profiles
inAe to all profiles in Te. In other words, the goal is to deanonymize
all anonymous users in the target OSN (who has accounts in the
auxiliary OSN).
In both targeted and global attacks, we use the Hungarian al-
gorithm for profile matching between the auxiliary and the target
OSN (as discussed in Section 3.3). Hungarian algorithm provides
a one-to-one match between all the users in the auxiliary and the
target OSN. However, we cannot expect that all anonymous users
in the target OSN to have profiles in the auxiliary OSN (we are only
interested in the ones that have profiles in both OSNs). Therefore,
some matches provided by the Hungarian algorithm are useless
for us. Thus, we define a confidence value and we only consider
the matches that are above the confidence value to evaluate the
precision and recall of our framework. For this purpose, we set
a “similarity threshold”. We examine the general similarity values
between the matches as a result of the Hungarian algorithm and we
only consider the matches that are above the similarity threshold
to compute the precision and recall.
In the following, we summarize the notations we use to compute
precision and recall for the targeted attack.
• True positive (tp): Both profiles from a coupled profile
are correctly paired with each other above the similarity
threshold.
• False positive (f p): One of the profiles from a coupled
profile pair is incorrectly paired with a different profile
above the similarity threshold.
• True negative (tn): One of the profiles from a coupled pro-
file pair is paired with a different profile below the similar-
ity threshold.
• False negative (f n): Coupled profiles are paired below the
similarity threshold.
For the global attack, in addition to the above rules, (i) false positive
also includes uncoupled profile pairs that are paired above the sim-
ilarity threshold, and (ii) true negative also includes the uncoupled
profile pairs that are paired below the similarity threshold. Then,
we compute the precision and recall as tp/(tp+ f p) and tp/(tp+ f n),
respectively. We also evaluate the “success rate” of the attack as
the fraction of correctly matched coupled pairs to all coupled pairs
regardless of the similarity threshold.
In all experiments, we compare our proposed attack with the
baseline approach for profile matching as described in the following.
In the baseline approach, we only use the obvious identifiers such as
user name, location, gender, and profile photo (we use our proposed
metrics to compute the individual similarities of these attributes).
K-nearest neighbor (KNN), decision tree, and SVM techniques are
used to classify the pairs as coupled or uncoupled. In KNN, a pair is
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assigned to the most common class among its k-nearest neighbors.
A decision tree has a tree like structure in which each internal node
represents a “test” on a feature, each branch represents the result
of the test, and each leaf represents a class label. In SVM model
the training data are represented as points in space and the data
of different categroies are divided by a clear gap. New examples
are mapped into the same space and are classified by checking on
which side of the gap they fall. To implement this baseline approach,
first, we train the classifiers with the training dataset constructed in
Section 3.2 (including only user name, location, gender, and profile
photo). Then, based on the trained model, each new pair is classified
using either KNN, decision tree, or SVM algorithm.
4.4 Results
In real life, two OSNs do not contain exactly the same set of users.
Thus, first, we evaluate the proposed attack by using a dataset that
includes both coupled and uncoupled users. For the global attack,
we tried to match all N = 1000 profiles in Ae to N = 1000 profiles
in Te. Among these profiles, 500 of them are coupled profiles, and
hence the goal is to make sure that these 500 users are matched
with high confidence. In targeted attack, we set the number of
target individuals to 100 from T . These 100 coupled profiles for the
targeted attack are randomly picked among 500 coupled pairs in
the test dataset. We run the targeted attack for 10 times and get the
average of the results. We ran all four experiments (introduced in
Section 4.2) for these settings. For the clarity of the presentation, in
the following, we refer the Twitter - Foursquare as D1 and Google+
- Twitter as D2. For all experiments, we report the precision and
recall values for the similarity threshold at which the precision and
recall curves (almost) intersect. In Table 4, we present the results
obtained for the linear regression model and in Table 5, the results
for the SVM model are shown. The variation of the precision and
recall values with the similarity threshold for both D1 and D2 and
for all four experiments (using the linear model regression ) are
shown in Figures 4 - 11. In general, we observed that the precision,
recall, and success rate of the linear regression model are higher
compared to the SVM model.
In Experiment 1 (in which we use all the considered attributes),
for the global attack, we obtained a precision value of around 0.80
(for D1) and 0.90 (for D2) for a similarity threshold of 0.6. This
means that if our proposed attack returns a similarity value that is
above 0.6 for a given profile pair, we can say that the corresponding
profiles belong to same individual with a high confidence. Also,
overall, we could correctly match 293 coupled profiles in D1 (with a
success rate of 58.6%) and 306 coupled profiles inD2 (with a success
rate of 62%) out of 500 in global attack. Furthermore, in targeted
attack, we obtained a precision value of 0.85 for D1 and 0.88 for
D2 (for a similarity threshold of 0.6) and overall, we were able to
correctly match 62 profiles in D1 and 63 profiles in D2 (out of 100).
Using the same test dataset, we obtained a precision that is close
to zero by using the baseline approach (both by using KNN and
decision trees and for both datasets). This shows that the proposed
framework significantly improves the baseline approach while it
provides comparable recall value compared to these machine learn-
ing techniques (this is further discussed in Figure 12).
In Experiment 2 (in which we use the four most identifying
attributes based on the weights in Table 3), we obtained a success
rate of 37.5% (for D1) and 43.6% (for D2) for the global attack with a
precision value of around 0.71 and 0.68 for D1 and D2, respectively.
Also, we could match 38 profiles (in D1) and 44 profiles (in D2) out
of 100 in the targeted attack. In Experiment 3 (in which we use all
the attributes but the user name), for the global attack, we obtained
a precision value of around 0.25 (for D1) and 0.63 (for D2) and an
overall success rate of 14% and 26% for D1 and D2, respectively.
Finally, in Experiment 4 (in which we use the weakest attributes),
for the global attack, we obtained a precision value of almost 0
(for D1) and 0.45 (for D2) and an overall success rate of 12% for
D2. Furthermore, in D2, we correctly matched 13 profiles out of
100 in the targeted attack. We further comment on these results
in the next section. Overall, the results show that publicly sharing
identifying attributes significantly helps the profile matching attack.
Furthermore, we show that even the weakest identifiers may cause
profile matching between the OSN users for some cases.
Next, only using the 500 coupled profiles in our test dataset, first
we ran all four experiments (introduced in Section 4.2) as before, and
then we studied the effects of database size to the profile matching
attack. Thus, for the global attack, we tried to match all N = 500
profiles in Ae to N = 500 profiles in Te (all these are coupled
profiles this time) and in targeted attack, we set the number of
target individuals to 100 from T as before. We show the success
rate (i.e., fraction of the correctly matched profiles as a result of the
attack) and precision/recall values we get from each experiment
for the linear regression model in Table 6. The results for the SVM
model are also shown in Table 7. As before, in general, we obtained
more accurate results for the linear regression model compared to
the SVM model. The precision and recall values reported in both
tables are obtained when we set the similarity threshold to the
value at which the precision and recall curves (almost) intersect. In
practice, the attacker can pick the similarity threshold based on the
set of attributes being used for the attack. In general, we observed
that all precision, recall, and success rate values we obtained for
this scenario are higher than the ones reported for the previous
attack scenario (in Table 4).
Finally, in Figure 12, we show the precision/recall of the proposed
attack for Experiment 1 as a function of the database size for the
global attack and for the linear regression model. For the proposed
attack, we report the precision and recall value for the similarity
threshold at which the precision and recall curves almost intersect
(as before). In the same figure, we also compare the proposed attack
with the baseline approach in which we use KNN, decision trees
and SVM for the profile matching as discussed in Section 4.3. We
observed that the precision/recall of the proposed attack does not
decrease with increasing database size, which shows the scalability
of our proposed attack. We also observed that the proposed attack
notably provides significantly higher precision values compared to
the baseline approach.
4.5 Discussion
In general, for all experiments, we observed that linear regression
provides better results compared to the SVM model. In terms of the
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Dataset 1 (Twitter - Foursquare) Dataset 2 (Google+ - Twitter)
Global Attack Targeted Attack Global Attack Targeted Attack
Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate
Experiment 1 (with all attributes) 0.79 0.79 58.6% 0.85 0.85 63% 0.88 0.89 62% 0.88 0.89 63%
Experiment 2 (with the most identifying attributes) 0.71 0.73 37.5% 0.73 0.73 38% 0.68 0.68 43.6% 0.69 0.69 44%
Experiment 3 (excluding the user name) 0.2 0.18 17.2% 0.2 0.19 14% 0.63 0.60 29.2% 0.60 0.62 26%
Experiment 4 (with the weakest identifiers) 0.004 0.004 0.4% ∼ 0 ∼ 0 0% 0.45 0.46 12% 0.43 0.43 13%
Table 4: Results of the profile matching attack (both targeted and global) with both coupled and uncoupled profiles by using
linear regression as the machine learning technique. For all experiments, we report the precision and recall values for the
similarity threshold at which the precision and recall curves (almost) intersect.
Dataset 1 (Twitter - Foursquare) Dataset 2 (Google+ - Twitter)
Global Attack Targeted Attack Global Attack Targeted Attack
Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate
Experiment 1 (with all attributes) 0.60 0.59 41% 0.72 0.73 54.5% 0.90 0.89 50% 0.87 0.86 62.6%
Experiment 2 (with the most identifying attributes) 0.68 0.67 38.6% 0.42 0.41 40% 0.42 0.42 41% 0.41 0.43 46%
Experiment 3 (excluding the user name) 0.08 0.07 11% ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0% 0.32 0.33 18% 0.21 0.27 13%
Experiment 4 (with the weakest identifiers) ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0% ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0% 0.33 0.32 13.4% 0.47 0.45 14%
Table 5: Results of the profile matching attack (both targeted and global) with both coupled and uncoupled profiles by using
SVM as the machine learning technique. Precision and recall values are computed with the similarity threshold at which the
precision and recall curves (almost) intersect.
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Figure 4: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD1 and for Experiment 1 in which
we use all the attributes for the profile matching.
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Figure 5: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD1 and for Experiment 2 in which
we only use the most identifying attributes for profile
matching.
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Figure 6: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD1 and for Experiment 3 in which
we use all the attributes except for the user name for pro-
file matching.
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Figure 7: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD1 and for Experiment 4 in which
we use the weakest identifiers for profile matching.
variation of the results obtained for different databases, we have
the following observations:
• Precision, recall, and success rate obtained from D2 are
higher compared to D1 as users share more complete and
informative information inGoogle+ compared to Foursquare.
In particular, Experiment 3 and Experiment 4 show that
Google+ profiles provide more complete information in
terms of freetext sharings, activity patterns, and interests
of the users.
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Figure 8: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD2 and for Experiment 1 in which
we use all the attributes for the profile matching.
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Figure 9: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD2 and for Experiment 2 in which
we only use the most identifying attributes for profile
matching.
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Figure 10: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD2 and for Experiment 3 in which
we use all the attributes except for the user name for pro-
file matching.
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Figure 11: Precision-recall curve for different values of
similarity threshold forD2 and for Experiment 4 in which
we use the weakest identifiers for profile matching.
Dataset 1 (Twitter - Foursquare) Dataset 2 (Google+ - Twitter)
Global Attack Targeted Attack Global Attack Targeted Attack
Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate
Experiment 1 (with all attributes) 0.82 0.83 65.6% 0.87 0.87 66% 0.90 0.90 66.2% 0.92 0.92 72%
Experiment 2 (with the most identifying attributes) 0.71 0.73 43% 0.72 0.73 45% 0.76 0.76 54% 0.74 0.74 56%
Experiment 3 (excluding the user name) 0.26 0.20 19% 0.3 0.28 16% 0.60 0.61 36% 0.60 0.60 38%
Experiment 4 (with the weakest identifiers) ∼ 0 ∼ 0 0.4% ∼ 0 ∼ 0 1% 0.71 0.69 12.8% 0.66 0.66 13%
Table 6: Results of the profile matching attack (both targeted and global) with only coupled profiles by using linear regres-
sion as the machine learning technique. Precision and recall values are computed with the similarity threshold at which the
precision and recall curves (almost) intersect.
Dataset 1 (Twitter - Foursquare) Dataset 2 (Google+ - Twitter)
Global Attack Targeted Attack Global Attack Targeted Attack
Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate Precision Recall Success rate
Experiment 1 (with all attributes) 0.66 0.67 50.4% 0.76 0.75 52% 0.91 0.92 50.1% 0.91 0.92 53%
Experiment 2 (with the most identifying attributes) 0.67 0.68 42% 0.75 0.76 46% 0.71 0.69 50% 0.51 0.50 50%
Experiment 3 (excluding the user name) 0.08 0.04 12.8% 0.08 0.01 12% 0.30 0.31 24% 0.33 0.3 21%
Experiment 4 (with the weakest identifiers) ∼ 0 ∼ 0 ∼ 0% 0.01 0.02 1% 0.21 0.22 11% 0.16 0.19 12%
Table 7: Results of the profile matching attack (both targeted and global) with only coupled profiles by using SVM as the
machine learning technique. Precision and recall values are computed with the similarity threshold at which the precision
and recall curves (almost) intersect.
• In D1, the weight for the activity pattern is higher than
the one for D2 because, some users tend to share their
Foursquare posts (check-ins) on their Twitter accounts at
the same time (there is no such behavior between Google+
and Twitter).
These observations can also be generalized for other OSNs that
share common behavior with the ones that we studied. We also
have the following observations in terms of the attributes we used:
• In both datasets, the user name attribute is the most differ-
entiating one compared to others.
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Figure 12: The effect of database size to the precision/recall for
the global attack in Experiment 1 with only coupled profiles.
• We observed that the sentiment attribute does not con-
tribute much to the profile matching in our experiments.
This is possibly due to limited number of tweets, tips, and
posts we processed. We expect that the contribution of this
attribute might be more significant if the whole timeline is
analyzed.
• Since the interest attribute depends on the created LDA
model, as the model is created using more data, we expect
more significant contribution from this attribute. Espe-
cially interest attribute would be a significant attribute for
domain specific OSNs (such as health-related OSNs).
Finally, we would like to highlight that Experiment 3 (in which we
use all the attributes except for the user name) has a success rate
of 38% and precision and recall values up to 0.60. This shows the
threat for many OSN users even when they use completely different
user names in different platforms. Therefore, in Section 5, we focus
on this experiment and propose countermeasures to mitigate the
risk while keeping a high profile utility for the OSN users.
5 COUNTERMEASURES
In this section, we propose and analyze some countermeasures
against the proposed attack. More specifically, we analyze how the
decrease in the utility in users’ profiles (e.g., controlled obfuscation
in the shared attributes of the users) affects the success of the
proposed attack. Such countermeasures can be implemented in two
ways: (i) the user, when he is sharing a new attribute in the target
OSN, can be warned by a local software (that knows the other
accounts of the user in auxiliary OSNs), or (ii) the target OSN can
compute the general similarity of the user (between all the users
in the auxiliary OSNs) and the user can be warned considering all
his shared attributes and all the other users in the auxiliary OSNs.
In the latter case, the target OSN does not really know the other
accounts of the user in auxiliary OSNs, it just warns the user against
a potential matching. The local software or the auxiliary OSN can
also provide suggestions to the user (when the user provides new
posts or attributes to the system) about the granularity of his shared
material in order to prevent the profile matching. The main goal in
both scenarios is to reduce the general similarity between the user
in the target OSN and his profile(s) in the auxiliary OSN(s) without
reducing the utility of the user in the target OSN too much.
As it is trivial for the users to pick different user names in
different OSNs, and since the user name attribute does not con-
tribute to the utility of an OSN account, in this section, we do
not consider the user name attribute. Let set UTj include all the
attributes (as listed in Table 1) of a user j in the target OSNT . Thus,
UTj = {ℓTj ,дTj ,pTj , f Tj ,aTj , tTj , sTj }. We define the utility of the user
j’s profile on the target OSNT as ΨTj =
∑
m∈U Tj cm ∗ψm , whereψm
and cm represent the utility of attributem and the importance (or
weight) of attributem for user j , respectively. While the utility of an
attribute can be quantified, its importance for a user is a personal
preference. Based on the preference of each user, our mitigation
model can compute the best privacy/utility level for each user. In
the rest of this work, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
importance of each attribute is equal.
5.1 Attribute Utilities
In the following, we discuss how we define the utility metric for
each attribute and analyze how each attribute can be modified (i.e.,
how each attributes’ utility is decreased) to reduce the success of the
profile matching attack. Then, we analyze the privacy/utility trade-
off for the OSN users by modelling this scenario as an optimization
problem.
5.1.1 Location. As shown, location is one of the attributes that
plays an important role in profile matching. We consider the loca-
tion attribute of a user j (ℓTj ) as the actual location declared by the
user in the target OSN (e.g., city, state, country). Thus, to reduce
the utility of this attribute, we can remove the location information
of target OSN users from coupled profile pairs in the test dataset
or generalize it (e.g., publish the country, rather than the state or
the city). Let the initial location similarity between two profiles
of the user be Sˆ(ℓAi , ℓTj ). The new (reduced) location similarity is
represented as S(ℓAi , ℓTj ). Hence, location utility of the user in the
target OSN due to ℓTj becomesψℓTj = S(ℓ
A
i , ℓ
T
j )/Sˆ(ℓAi , ℓTj ).
5.1.2 Gender. Gender attribute is handled differently forD1 and
D2. In D2 (when Google+ is the target OSN), the users explicitly
reveal their gender information on the target OSN, and hence we
choose whether to keep or remove this information. In D1 (when
Twitter is the target OSN), on the other hand, users do not explicitly
share their gender information. Thus, we try to infer genders of
the users from their user names (more specifically, from the “name”
field of the user). To reduce the utility of the gender attribute, we
modify the “name” field of the target OSN users. Let the initial
gender similarity between two profiles of the user be Sˆ(дAi ,дTj ) and
the new similarity be S(дAi ,дTj ). The gender utility of the user in
the target OSN is represented asψдTj = S(д
A
i ,д
T
j )/Sˆ(дAi ,дTj ).
5.1.3 Profile Photo. To reduce the utility of the profile photo
attribute (i.e., to reduce the photo similarity between two coupled
pairs in the test dataset), we propose using alternate photos (as
the profile photo of the individual) from the OSN profile of the
same individual (given they exist). Thus, the photo utility of the
user in the target OSN becomesψpTj = S(p
A
i ,p
T
j )/Sˆ(pAi ,pTj ) (e.g., if
the profile photo remains intact, the utility remains as 1), where
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Sˆ(pAi ,pTj ) and S(pAi ,pTj ) represents the initial similarity and the
similarity after the profile photo is changed to an alternate one,
respectively.
5.1.4 Freetext. To reduce the freetext utility of the coupled users
in the test dataset, we gradually reduce the number of common
extracted features (obtained by NER) from the information provided
in both the auxiliary and the target OSNs. Thus, if the initial freetext
similarity between two profiles of the user is Sˆ(f Ai , f Tj ) and the new
similarity is S(f Ai , f Tj ), the freetext utility of the user in the target
OSN is represented asψf Tj = S(f
A
i , f
T
j )/Sˆ(f Ai , f Tj ). In practice, this
decrease in utility can be controlled directly by the user without
distorting the meaning of the freetext.
5.1.5 Activity Pattern. Dates and times of users’ posts in the aux-
iliary and the target OSNs can be used to build an activity pattern
for each user. As shown, this information also helps connecting the
anonymized profile of a user to his unanonymized account. Espe-
cially, simultaneous posts of the user in the auxiliary and the target
OSNs pose the highest risk for profile matching. To reduce the
utility of a user’s activity patterns, we remove some selected posts
of the user from the target OSN (or post them with some latency).
In particular, we remove or delay the posts that are posted close to
each other in both OSNs. Thus, the activity pattern utility for a user
j in the target OSN is defined asψaTj = S(a
A
i ,a
T
j )/Sˆ(aAi ,aTj ), where
Sˆ(aAi ,aTj ) and S(aAi ,aTj ) represent the initial activity pattern simi-
larity and the new activity pattern similarity between two profiles
of the same user, respectively.
5.1.6 Interest. Users create posts (e.g., in terms of tips or tweets)
expressing their opinions, feelings, or thoughts without being aware
that this information can be used to infer their interests. We use
an LDA model to infer the interests of a user from his posts in the
OSNs (in Section 3.1). As shown, a user’s interests in two OSNs can
also play a role for connecting his two accounts to each other. We
reduce the interest utility of a user by removing some of his selected
posts from the target OSN. While doing so, we give the priority to
the posts that increase the interest similarity between the profiles
of the user in the auxiliary and target OSNs. Thus, if the initial
interest similarity between two profiles of the user is Sˆ(tAi , tTj ) and
the new similarity is S(tAi , tTj ), the interest utility of the user in the
target OSN is represented asψtTj = S(t
A
i , t
T
j )/Sˆ(tAi , tTj ).
5.1.7 Sentiment. As discussed, users’ mood may help to connect
their OSN accounts to each other. To reduce the daily sentiment
utility of a user, we remove from the target OSN the posts that
are posted close to each other in both OSNs. Thus, the daily sen-
timent utility for a user j in the target OSN is defined as ψsTj =
S(sAi , sTj )/Sˆ(sAi , sTj ), where Sˆ(sAi , sTj ) and S(sAi , sTj ) represent the ini-
tial daily sentiment similarity and the new daily sentiment similarity
between two profiles of the same user, respectively.
5.2 Effect of Countermeasures on Privacy and
Utility
Here, we analyze the tradeoff between the privacy and utility. That
is we study the optimal point at which (i) the success of the pro-
file matching attack is minimized (i.e., target OSN users has high
privacy), and (ii) the utility of the target OSN users is maximized
(i.e., attributes in the profiles of target OSN users are not distorted
much). Due to the space constraints, we ran our experiments only
on D2 (in which Google+ is the target OSN) by using the linear re-
gression model. Furthermore, we only considered the global attack
and we tried to match N = 500 profiles in Ae to N = 500 profiles
in Te (all of these profiles are coupled). Since we consider all the
attributes except for the user name, we study the balance between
privacy and utility under Experiment 3 (in Section 4). Under these
settings, by using the original (undistorted) profiles of the users, we
obtained a precision and recall of 0.6 and 0.61, respectively (as also
shown in Table 6). Also, we observed a success rate of 36%. That is,
we could correctly match 181 profiles in D2.
First, we show the effect of each attribute to the profile matching
attack and show how the success rate of the attack decreases with
the decrease in utility of each attribute. We gradually reduced the
utility of each attribute independently for the target OSN profiles
and observed how the success rate of the profile matching attack is
affected from this change when only the corresponding attribute is
modified and all the remaining attributes remain intact. In Table 8,
we report the average attribute utilities computed over these users
with respect to the success rate of the attack.
For illustrative purposes, we also use a dummy coupled profile
pair in Figure 14.6. In Table 8 we show how the particular target
profile in Figure 14 changes with the decrease in the utility of each
corresponding attribute. As the utility of an attribute decreases, the
attribute should be removed partially or completely (as shown in
Table 8). As it was mentioned previously, profile photo is replaced
by an alternate photo that provides lower photo similarity with the
user profile in the auxiliary OSN. We observed that, as expected,
the individual contributions (i.e., success rate) of the attributes that
has lower weights (in Table 3) to the profile matching attack are
also low. Therefore, reducing the utility of such attributes, even
though slightly reduces the success rate of the attack, does not have
a significant impact on the overall success rate of the attack (in
which all attributes are used).
Nest, we study the balance between the privacy of the target OSN
users and the utility of their profiles in the target OSN. Typically, if
a user has an anonymized account in the target OSN, he does not
want to be deanonymized. But, at the same time, to get the best
service quality from the target OSN, the user also do not want to
over-distort his profile. Therefore, there is a tradeoff between his
privacy and utility. We formulate this tradeoff as an optimization
problem and find the optimal point that maximizes both privacy
and utility of the users in the target OSN.
LetUAi andU
T
j be two coupled profiles belonging to the same in-
dividual in OSNsA andT . We represent the set of coupled attributes
of these two profiles asUA,Ti, j = {(ℓAi , ℓTj ), (дAi ,дTj ), (pAi ,pTj ), (f Ai , f Tj ),
6Profile pair in Figure 14 does not belong to a real individual; it was created by us for
illustrative purposes.
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Utility Success rate of the attack Original attribute Modified attribute
Location 1 36% Hamburg, Germany Hamburg, Germany0 36% -
Gender 1 36% Male Male0 36% -
Profile photo
1 36%
Refer to Figure 13(a)
Refer to Figure 13(a)
0.5 16% Refer to Figure 13(b)
0 15% -
Freetext 1 36% Sit with a pretty girl for an hour, and it seems like a minute Sit with a pretty girl for an hour, and it seems like a minute0.5 33% -
Activity pattern 1 36% 20 posts exist 20 posts exist0 36% 0 posts exist (all removed)
Interest
1 36%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Topic
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Topic
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
20 posts exist
0.5 36%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Topic
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
20 posts exist
17 posts exist (3 removed)
Sentiment
1 36%
Sentiment
Positive Negative
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Sentiment
Positive Negative
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
20 posts exist
0.5 36%
Sentiment
Positive Negative
Pr
ob
. D
is
t.
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
20 posts exist
17 posts exist (3 removed)
Table 8: Average individual attribute utilities computed over 500 coupled profiles with respect to the success rate of the attack.
During the analysis of each individual attribute, we assume that the attacker uses all the other attributes in Experiment 3 (in
Section 4) intact. “Original attribute” and “modified attribute” are shown for the target OSN profile introduced in Figure 14(a).
For the “activity pattern”, we show the number of posts that should be removed. For the “interest”, we show the number of
removed posts and the variation in the topic distribution of the user that is obtained as a result of the created LDA model
(this distribution is in particularly important as the user may receive personalized services from the target OSN based on his
interests). For the “sentiment”, we show the number of removed posts and the histogram of the user’s sentiment profile.
(a) Utility=1 (b) Utility=0.5 (c) Utility=0.3
Figure 13: Effect of alternative photos for the profile photo of the target OSN profile in Figure 14(a) for three different utility
values.
(aAi ,aTj ), (tAi , tTj ), (sAi , sTj )}. Also, let setsW andCj include theweights of the attributes for profile matching7 and importance of each at-
tribute (in terms of utility) for user j in the target OSN. Thus,W =
7We used the weights obtained via the linear regression technique here.
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Michael Lehman
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ABOUT
Sit with a pretty 
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Post 1
Post 20
.
.
.
Gender: male
Hamburg, Germany
(a) Profile in the target OSN
Mick Lehman
@micklehman
student in physics 
department
Germany
Search TwitterHome      About
TWEETS FOLLOWING FOLLOWERS
20              560                 470
@micklehman
When you sit on a red-hot cinder a second seems 
like an hour
11:08 - 03 Aug 2016 - UTC+01:00 (Berlin)
Tweet 1
Tweet 20
.
.
.
(b) Profile in the auxiliary OSN
Figure 14: Dummy coupled profile pair created to show the effect of decreasing utility. We also assigned 20 posts and 20 tweets
to the profiles in order to evaluate the utilities for the “activity pattern”, “interest”, and "sentiment" attributes, however we do
not show these posts and tweets due to space limitations.
{wℓ ,wд ,wp ,wf ,wa ,wt ,ws } andCj = {cℓTj , cдTj , cpTj , cf Tj , caTj , ctTj , csTj }.
Then, for each user j with the profile UTj in the target OSN (whose
profile isUAi in the auxiliary OSN), we formulate this linear opti-
mization problem as follows:
maximize ΨTj =
∑
m∈U Tj
cm ×ψm
subject to S(UAi ,UTj ) ≤ τ
where,ψm and cm represent the utility of attributem and the im-
portance of attributem for user j, respectively. For simplicity, we
assume that the importance of each attribute for the user to be
equal. Also, τ represents the maximum similarity value that we
want to obtain between the coupled profiles. Smaller τ provides
better privacy for the profiles of users in the target OSN, but smaller
values of τ also causes lower profile utility. Following our previous
discussion, ΨTj and S(UAi ,UTj ) are computed as follows:
ΨTj =
|UA,Ti, j |∑
k=1
S(UA,Ti, j (k))
Sˆ(UA,Ti, j (k))
×Cj (k) (10)
and
S(UAi ,UTj ) = w0 +
|UA,Ti, j |∑
k=1
S(UA,Ti, j (k)) ×W (k). (11)
The above optimization problem is similar to the bounded knap-
sack problem [16]. To solve this problem, we use the branch-and-
bound technique [28]. In general, branch-and-bound technique
finds the optimal solution and represents a good tradeoff between
time and storage space. It is a systematic enumeration of all can-
didate solutions, where large subsets of candidate solutions are
pruned by using upper bounds on the quantity being optimized.
Branch-and-bound technique generally relies on two main rules:
(i) the estimation of the upper bound at any node (state of assigned
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Figure 15: Solution of the optimization problem for different
τ values: Variation of the average utility value for the 500
coupled profiles with respect to the decrease in success rate
of the attack for different τ values.
variables) in the search tree, and (ii) a choice criterion for the se-
lection of a branching variable at the node selected for further
partitioning.
We solved the above optimization problem for the coupled pairs
(in the test dataset) for different values of τ and observed the de-
crease in the utility of the profiles. Then, we applied the Hungarian
algorithm using the new similarity values and observed the de-
crease in the success rate of the attack. In Figure 15, we show the
variation of the average utility value for the coupled profiles with
respect to the decrease in the success rate of the attack for different
τ values. We observed that with a slight change in the utility of
the profiles, we could reduce the success rate of the attack by more
than half. Overall, we observed that the proposed optimization
based countermeasure causes only slight modifications (and hence
high profile utility) in the profile of the user while it significantly
mitigates the profile matching attack.
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6 RELATEDWORK
In the literature, mostworks focus on profilematching (or deanonymiza-
tion) by using structural information that mainly relies on the net-
work structure of OSN. Narayanan and Shmatikov show that statis-
tical approaches on high-dimensional micro-data can deanonymize
potentially sensitive information [22]. In another work, Narayanan
and Shmatikov propose a framework for analyzing privacy and
anonymity in social networks and a deanonymization (DA) algo-
rithm that is based purely on the network topology [23]. Another
approach by Wondracek et al. uses group membership found on
social networks to identify the users [33]. They show that the group
membership is enough to at least reduce the number of possible
candidates matching the target user. Nilizadeh et al. propose a
community-level DA attack [24] by extending the work in [23].
Recently, Korula and Lattanzi propose a DA attack that starts from
a set of seeds and iteratively matches a pair of users with the most
number of neighboring mapped pairs [14]. Unlike previous attacks,
Pedarsani et al. propose a seed-free DA attack [26]. It is a Bayesian
based model for graph DA which uses degrees and distances to
other nodes as each node’s fingerprints. Ji et al. propose a secure
graph data sharing/publishing system in which they implement and
evaluate graph data anonymization algorithms, data utility metrics,
and modern structure-based deanonymization attacks [13]. Further-
more, Ji et al. quantify deanonymizability and partial deanonymiz-
ability of real world social networkswith seed information, in which
a social network follows an arbitrary distribution model [12]. As
opposed to these works, we use only publicly available unstructural
data for profile matching (as mentioned, when possible, graphi-
cal structure can be used as an additional feature in our proposed
model).
There are also studies that use a combination of structural and
unstructural information to match user profiles. It has been shown
that by using tagging information provided by users or user profile
information such as user name, profile photo, description, and/or
location, users in different OSNs can be linked to each other [11, 21,
25, 32]. Some works use only user names and their tags (separately
or together) to link different users [11]. In another work, by search-
ing user names in Google the authors find the coupled profiles [21],
however, this might not always be true. Nunes et al. apply different
classifiers in the feature vectors consisting of user name, posts, and
sets of friends similarities [25]. Furthermore, Vosecky et al. only
use nick name, email, and date of birth to link the users [32]. Liu et
al. propose a method to match user profiles across multiple com-
munities by using the rareness and commonness of usernames [18].
They assume that usernames across social networks are consistent,
which is not always the case. Zafarani et. al analyze the behaviour
patterns of the users, the language used and the writing style to
link users across social media sites [34]. To evaluate the quality of
different user attributes in profile matching, Goga et al. identify
four properties: availability, consistency, non-impersonability, and
discriminability [10]. They demonstrate that by using the location,
activity, and writing style of a user, profiles across OSNs can be still
matched.
In one of the recent works, Liu et al. propose a framework called
HYDRA that uses both structural and unstructural information to
match profiles across OSNs [19, 20]. In a nutshell, the proposed
framework has three steps named behavior similarity modeling,
structure consistency modeling, and multi-objective optimization.
However, the dataset that is used to evaluate this framework is not
public, the authors only used the coupled profiles to evaluate their
proposed framework, and only the obvious identifiers of the users
are used for the evaluation. Peled et al. present machine learning
based methods to match users profiles in different OSNs [27]. They
extract multiple features belonging to three main categories: (i)
name-based features, (ii) user-information features, and (iii) social
network topological-based features. By using the extracted features,
different classifiers are built. The main limitation of [27] is the fact
that the coupled pairs are created only based on the user name.
If the user names of the profiles match, the profile photo is used
for validation. When the user names do not match, the profile
pair is considered as uncoupled, which might not be always the
case. In this work, we consider a wider spectrum of attributes,
extensively analyze the effect of non-obvious identifiers to the
profile matching attack (e.g., to quantify the risk for forum users),
and propose countermeasures against the attack.
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we have proposed a framework for profile matching
in unstructured online social networks (OSNs). Our results show
that using only unstructural information, users’ profiles in different
OSNs can be matched with high precision and success rate. We have
shown how different spectrum of publicly available attributes can be
utilized for such an attack. We have also shown that even a limited
number of non-obvious identifiers of the users, such as activity
patterns across different OSNs, interest similarities, and freetext
similarities may be sufficient for the attacker in some cases.We have
shown that the proposed attack significantly improves the baseline
approach in terms of precision while providing comparable recall
values compared to state of the art machine learning techniques.
To mitigate this profile matching threat, we have also proposed
possible countermeasures. In particular, we have studied the balance
between the privacy and profile utility to find an optimal point that
minimizes the threat and maximizes the utility the user receives
from the OSN. This optimization-based techniquewe have proposed
as a countermeasure can be widely used by the users to control their
shared content on the Internet. As future work, we will work on
approximate graph-matching algorithms to improve the efficiency
of the proposed attack. We will also extend the work for multiple
auxiliary OSNs that may have correlations with each other.
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